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Abstract. In this paper, we extend Gary Becker’s empirical analysis of the marriage
market to same-sex couples. Beckers’s theory rationalizes the well-known phenomenon of
homogamy among heterosexual couples: individuals mate with their likes because many
characteristics, such as education, consumption behaviour, desire to nurture children, re-
ligion, etc., exhibit strong complementarities in the household production function. How-
ever, because of asymmetries in the distributions of male and female characteristics, men
and women may need to marry “up” or “down” according to the relative shortage of their
characteristics among the populations of men and women. Yet, among homosexual cou-
ples, this limit does not exist as partners are drawn from the same population, and thus the
theory of assortative mating would boldly predict that individuals will choose a partner
with nearly identical characteristics. Empirical evidence suggests a very different picture:
a robust stylized fact is that the correlation of characteristics is in fact weaker among
the homosexual couples. In this paper, we build an equilibrium model of the same-sex
marriage market which allows for straightforward identification of the gains to marriage.
We estimate the model with 2008-2012 ACS data on California and show that positive
assortative mating is weaker for homosexuals than for heterosexuals with respect to age
and race. Yet, contrarily to previous empirical findings, our results suggest that postitive
assortative mating with respect to education is stronger on the same-sex marriage market.
As regards labor market outcomes, such as hourly wages and working hours, we find that
the process of specialization within the household mainly applies to heterosexual couples.
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1. Introduction
How individuals sort themselves into marriage has important implications for income
distribution, labor supply, and inequality (Becker, 1973). Strong evidence shows that the
rise in income inequality across households over the last fifty years is partly due to assortative
mating, as individuals have been sorting into increasingly assortative marriages (Greenwood,
Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos, 2014; Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar, 2014).
Individuals tend to mate with their likes, although, because of asymmetries between the
distributions of characteristics in male and female populations, homogamy cannot be perfect
among heterosexual couples. In other words, heterosexuals cannot always find a “clone” of
the opposite gender to match with. A large body of the literature has noticed that, up until
recently, “men married down, women married up” due to the gender asymmetry in edu-
cational achievement that has only recently started to fade (Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko,
2006). Gender asymmetries exist in other dimensions such as biological characteristics (win-
dows of fertility1, life expectancy, bio-metric characteristics), psychological traits, economic
attributes (due to the gender wage gap), ethnic and racial characteristics (immigration is not
symmetric across gender, see Weiss, Yi, and Zhang, 2013) or demographic characteristics
(some countries, such as China, have a comparatively more imbalanced gender ratios).
Homogamy has been famously rationalized by Becker’s theory of positive assortative
mating (PAM), arguably the simplest structural model of homogamy: men and women
are characterized by some socio-economic “ability” index and the marriage market clears so
that men are matched with women that are as close as possible to them in terms of an index
accounting for all the characteristics that matter on the marriage market2. The (strong)
1Women’s fertility rapidly declines with age, whereas men’s fertility does not. Biologists and anthropolo-
gists argue that this dissymmetry could explain the well-documented preference of men for younger women
(Hayes, 1995; Kenrick and Keefe, 1992). Low (2013) evaluates this young age premium for women and names
it “reproductive capital,” as it gives them an advantage on the marriage market over older women.
2Becker (1973) expects most of non-labor market traits, such as “intelligence, height, skin color, age,
education, family background or religion”, to be complementary. However, he also suggests that some
attributes (e.g. some personality traits) could be substitutes. As concerns labor market traits, Becker
suggests that we should observe a negative correlation between wage rates, because of partners maximizing
marriage surplus. More recently, Chiappori, Oreffice, and Quintana-Domeque (2012) model a Becker-like
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prediction of this model is that the rank of the husband’s index in the men’s population is
the same as the wife’s in the women’s population. However, this does not imply that the
partners’ indices are identical: they would be so only if the distributions of the indices were
the same for both men and women’s populations.
This analysis of the marriage market has attracted wide attention in the economic litera-
ture, in spite of its shortcomings. One shortcoming is that it originally refers to heterosexual
unions only. However, in a growing number of countries, same-sex couples have gained legal
recognition and the institutions of civil partnership and marriage no longer require that
the partners must be of opposite sex. This official recognition is the result of several legal
disputes and social activism by the gay and lesbian communities3. The issue of whether
to recognize same-sex unions has long been a topical subject in many countries, since it
challenges the traditional model of family. From both an economic and a legal point of
view, the definition of what “family” means has relevant political implications as long as
this term is present - and is generally central - in many modern constitutions and legal
systems. Consequently, family households benefit from a special attention of policy-makers.
Therefore, a discussion of the issues related to the same-sex marriage - remarkably at pol-
icy level - requires a good understanding of similarities and differences in the household
dynamics among same-sex and different-sex couples. Besides, it is important to remember
that the legal recognition of same-sex couples is only one of many transformations that the
institution of the family has gone through in the last decades (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007;
Stevenson, 2008). Finally, since more and more data on same-sex unions have been made
available, the extension of the economic analysis of family to the homosexual population
can now be taken to data.
While it is natural to consider an extension of Becker’s theory of PAM to same-sex
households, it is worthwhile noting that the previous considerations on asymmetries between
marriage market with sorting on a unidimensional index. The estimation of such index reveals that high
values in some attributes can compensate for poor values in others, thus showing that sorting is based on
complex interactions between traits.
3Public actions for homosexual rights acknowledgment are often considered to have started in 1969, in
New York City. See Eskridge Jr (1993) and Sullivan (2009) for a detailed history and a full overview of the
arguments in favor and against same-sex marriage.
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men and women distributions only hold as long as each partner comes from a separate set
according to his/her sex. On the same-sex marriage market, the two partners are drawn
from the same population and the distributions of characteristics is the same for each of
them. Hence, the assortative mating theory pushed to its limits implies that, in this setting,
partners should be exactly identical, i.e. each individual will choose to marry someone with
identical characteristics.
In spite of such theoretical predictions, facts suggest a very different picture. Recent
empirical results on the 1990 and 2000 American Census show that same-sex couples have
less correlated attributes than different-sex ones, at least in terms of a variety of non-labor
traits, including racial and ethnic background, age and education (Jepsen and Jepsen, 2002;
Schwartz and Graf, 2009). Studies on Norway, Sweden (Andersson, Noack, Seierstad, and
Weedon-Fekjær, 2006) and Netherlands (Verbakel and Kalmijn, 2014) brought to similar
findings. In order to explain this heterogeneity, the literature has suggested several possible
reasons. A first consideration is that homosexuals might be forced to pick from a restricted
pool because of their small numbers in the population (Harry, 1984; Kurdek and Schmitt,
1987; Andersson, Noack, Seierstad, and Weedon-Fekjær, 2006; Schwartz and Graf, 2009;
Verbakel and Kalmijn, 2014), thus having a narrower choice when choosing their partner,
resulting in a more diverse range of potential matches. Furthermore, homosexuals have
been found to be more likely to live in urban neighborhoods than heterosexuals, and since
diversities in socio-economic traits are stronger in cities, this facilitates the crossing of racial
and social boundaries (Black, Gates, Sanders, and Taylor, 2002; Rosenfeld and Kim, 2005;
Black, Sanders, and Taylor, 2007). In light of these observations, one could argue that
the homosexual marriage market is faced with stronger search frictions. Nevertheless, this
might not necessarily be the case if the potential partners gather in specific locations, as
it is case for the choice of “gay-friendly” cities and neighborhoods. Other analysts argue
that homosexuals may have different preferences than heterosexuals, as they tend to be
less conservative than straight individuals. Some explanations in this regard point out
that, since homosexuality is still considered in some cultures as at odds with prevailing
social norms, homosexuals might grow less inclined to passively accept social conventions,
and consequently they would end up choosing their partner with fewer concerns about
LIKE ATTRACT LIKE? 5
his/her background traits4(Blumstein, Schwartz, et al., 1983; Meier, Hull, and Ortyl, 2009;
Schwartz and Graf, 2009). The detachment from the community of origin and the research
for more tolerant surroundings have an influence both on values and social norms and on
the heterogeneity of interpersonal ties.
A part of these explanations has to do with individual preferences, whereas another part
has to do with demographics, i.e. the distribution of characteristics in the population. It
is clear that the explanations listed in the former paragraph, while different in nature, are
not mutually exhaustive, but all contribute to a better understanding of the equilibrium
patterns. For instance, a high correlation in education may arise from individual tastes
(as individuals could find more desirable to match with a partner with similar educational
background), but also from demographics (indeed, if some educational category represents
a large share of individuals, this will increase odds of unions whithin this category, thus
mechanically increasing the correlation in education).
In this paper, we focus on individual preferences: we would like to compare the “pref-
erence for homogamy” across same-sex and different-sex households. In order to do so, we
need a methodology to interpret the observation of matching patterns which disentangles
preferences from demographics. This is achieved by a structural approach, which captures
the preference parameters leading to equilibrium matching patterns that exhibit the closest
fit with the patterns actually observed. This approach hence will require an equilibrium
model of matching.
In the wake of Becker (1973, 1981), the economic literature has classically modeled the
marriage market as a bipartite matching game with transferable utility. A couple consists
of two partners coming each from a separate or identical subpopulation (respectively, in the
case of heterosexual and homosexual unions). Both partners are characterized by vectors of
4Note that household location choice and social norms are strictly related: it has been reported that
homosexuals often leave their town of origin and escape social pressure exerted by relatives and acquaintances
and go living in larger cities reputed to be gay/lesbian-friendly (Rosenfeld and Kim, 2005). Analogously,
homosexuals are aware that they have more probabilities of avoiding discrimination by achieving higher
educational levels and orienting their professional choices toward congenial working environments (Blumstein,
Schwartz, et al., 1983; Verbakel and Kalmijn, 2014).
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attributes, such as education, wealth, age, physical attractiveness, etc. It is assumed that,
when two partners with respective attributes x and y form a pair, they generate a surplus
equal to Φ(x, y), which is shared endogenously between them. In the case of separate sub-
populations (heterosexual marriage), the landmark contribution of Choo and Siow (2006)
showed that the surplus function Φ can easily be estimated based on matching patterns
modulo a distributional assumption on unobservable variations in preferences, and was fol-
lowed by a rich literature (Fox, 2010; Galichon and Salanie´, 2014; Chiappori, Salanie´, and
Weiss, 2011, to cite a few). Dupuy and Galichon (2014) extended Choo and Siow’s model
to the case of continuous attributes and propose the convenient bilinear parameterization
Φ (x, y) = x′Ay, where A is a matrix called “affinity matrix” whose terms reflect the strength
of assortativeness between two partners’ attributes. However, the bipartite assumption is
restrictive and does not allow to estimate the surplus on same-sex marriage markets, and,
to the best of our knowledge, no such estimation procedure is proposed in the literature.
This problem is addressed in the present paper, using the observation by Chiappori, Gali-
chon, and Salanie´ (2012) that, when the population to be matched is large, the same-sex
marriage problem or “unipartite matching problem” can be theoretically reformulated as
a heterosexual matching problem or “bipartite matching problem”. As a consequence, the
empirical tools developed to perform estimation of preferences on the heterosexual mar-
riage market, including those cited above, can be adapted to estimate preferences on the
homosexual marriage market.
A few papers already deal with the issue of assortativeness among same-sex households,
although none of them allows to draw conclusion on preference parameters. The most
relevant benchmarks for the empirical results of this work are the aforementioned Jepsen and
Jepsen (2002) and Schwartz and Graf (2009). Both papers make use of the American census
data (1990 and 1990/2000 respectively) and their most important result is that members
of different-sex couples are more alike than those of same-sex ones with respect to non-
labor market traits. The heterogeneity in assortativeness is measured in a logit framework
containing dedicated parameters for homogamy. In general, in a logit framework individuals
choose their best option among all possibilities. However, this fails to take into account the
fact that matching takes place under scarcity constraint on the various characteristics.
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In this paper, we fully describe the equilibrium matching pattern in respect of market
conditions. We estimate the true preference parameters for each type of couple (same-sex
and different-sex ones): the following cross-comparison turns out to be very insightful for
the understanding of heterogeneity in assortativeness.
The contributions of the present paper are twofold. On a methodological level, this pa-
per is the first to propose a structural estimator of the matching surplus which applies to
same-sex households, or, more generally, to instances of the unipartite matching problem.
On an empirical level, we provide evidence through the means of a structural analysis that,
as concerns age and ethnicity, the heterosexual population has a stronger preference for
homogamy than the homosexual one. Nevertheless, in contrast with previous empirical
findings (Jepsen and Jepsen, 2002; Schwartz and Graf, 2009), we find that sorting on edu-
cation is stronger on the same-sex marriage market. Further, we also look at labor market
traits such as hourly wages and working hours. Comparing assortativeness on labor market
outcomes between homosexual and heterosexual couples allows us to infer different family
dynamics and differences in the household specialization process. Finally, we briefly discuss
the estimates of the mutually exhaustive affinity indices obtained through saliency analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will present the model and section
3 the estimation. We describe our data in section 4 and our results in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2. The model
In what follows, it is assumed that the full type of each individual, i.e. the complete set
of all individual characteristics that matter for the marriage market (physical attributes,
psychological traits, socio-economic variables, gender, sexual orientation, etc.), is fully ob-
served by market participants. Each individual is characterized by a vector of observable
characteristics x ∈ X = RK , which constitutes his observable type. However, we allow
for a certain degree of unobserved heterogeneity by assuming that agents experience un-
observed variations in tastes that are not observable to the analyst, following Choo and
Siow (2006). In this paper, types are assumed to be continuous, as in Dupuy and Galichon
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(2014), hereafter DG, and Menzel (2013). Assume that the distribution of characteristics x
has a density function f with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Without loss of generality,
the marginal distribution of the attributes is assumed to be centered, i.e. E[X] = 0.
2.1. Populations. A pair is an ordered set of individuals, denoted [x1, x2] where x1, x2 ∈
X , in which the order of the partner matters, which implies that the pair [x1, x2] will be
distinguished from its inverse twin [x2, x1]. In empirical datasets, x1 will often be denomi-
nated “head of the household” and x2 “spouse of the head of the household” even though
this denomination is used mainly for practical reasons and cannot be fully representative
of the actual roles in the household. A couple is an unordered set of individuals (x1, x2),
so that the couple (x1, x2) coincides with the couple (x2, x1). A matching is the density
of probability pi (x1, x2) of drawing a couple (x1, x2). Pairs [x1, x2] and [x2, x1] stand for
the same couple, so that one has pi (x1, x2) := pi [x1, x2] + pi [x2, x1], hence the symmetry
condition pi (x1, x2) = pi (x2, x1) holds. This symmetry constraint means that the position
of the individual must not matter and thus that there are no predetermined “roles” within
the couple that would be relevant for the analysis5.
We shall impose assumptions that will ensure that everyone is matched at equilibrium,
hence the density of probability of type x ∈ X in the population is given by ∫X pi(x, x′)dx′ =∫
X pi [x, x
′] dx′ +
∫
X pi [x
′, x] dx′, where the right hand side counts the number of individuals
of type x matched either as the head of household (first term), or as the spouse of the head
(second term). Thus, we are led to assume:
Assumption 1 (Populations). The density pi (x, x′) over couples satisfies pi ∈ Msym(f),
where
Msym(f) =
pi ≥ 0 :
 ∫X pi(x, x′)dx′ = f(x) ∀x ∈ X
pi(x1, x2) = pi(x2, x1) ∀x1, x2 ∈ X
 .
5Candelon and Dupuy (2014) extend Chiappori, Galichon, and Salanie´ (2012)’s analysis to a model where
agents form couples with endogenously assigned roles according to their characteristics. The model is applied
to professional cycling, where teams usually choose one leader, typically the best rider, and some helpers.
However, a similar hierarchical structure would be simplistic in a model of marriage.
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In contrast, in the classical bipartite problem, we try to match optimally two distinct pop-
ulations (men and women) which are characterized by the same set of observable variables
X , and it is assumed that the distribution of the characteristics among the population of
men has density f , while the density of the characteristics among the population of women
is g. In this setting, the feasibility constraints take on the typical following form:
M(f, g) =
pi ≥ 0 :
∫X pi(x, y)dy = f(x) ∀x ∈ X∫
X pi(x, y)dx = g (y) ∀y ∈ X

Hence, pi ∈ Msym(f) if and only if pi ∈ M(f, f) and pi (x1, x2) = pi (x2, x1). Thus the
feasibility set in the unipartite problem and in the bipartite problem differ only by the
additional symmetry constraint in the unipartite problem.
2.2. Preferences. We now model preferences. Following DG, it is assumed that a given
individual x1 does not have access to the whole population, but only to a set of acquaintances
{zxk : k ∈ Z+}, randomly drawn, which is described below.
Assumption 2 (Preferences). An individual of type x matched to an individual of type x′
enjoys a surplus which is the sum of three terms:
(i) the systematic part of the pre-transfer matching surplus enjoyed by x from his/her
match with x′, denoted α (x, x′).
(ii) the equilibrium utility transfer from x′ to x, denoted τ (x, x′). This quantity can be
either positive or negative; we assume utility is fully transferable, hence feasibility imposes
τ (x, x′) + τ (x′, x) = 0.
(iii) a “sympathy shock” (σ/2) εx, which is stochastic conditional on x and x′, and whose
value is −∞ if x is not acquainted with an individual x′. The quantity σ/2 is simply a
scaling factor. More precisely, the set of acquaintances is an infinite countable random
subset of X ; it is such that (zxk , εxk) are the points of a Poisson process on X ×R of intensity
dz × e−εdε.
The utility of unmatched individuals is −∞ for all types, so that every market participant
is matched at equilibrium.
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While the stochastic structure of the unobserved variation in preference described in part
(iii) of Assumption 2 may appear complex, it is in fact a very natural extension of the logit
framework to the continuous case, as we now argue. Indeed, it will imply that the individual
maximization program of an agent of type x with this set of acquaintances is
max
k∈Z+
α (x, zxk ) + τ (x, z
x
k ) +
σ
2
εxk, (2.1)
where the utility of matching with acquaintance k yields a total surplus which is the sum
of three terms, the systematic pre-transfer surplus, the transfer, and the sympathy shock.
Define the systematic quantity of surplus at equilibrium U by
U
(
x, x′
)
:= α
(
x, x′
)
+ τ
(
x, x′
)
thus an individual of type x hence maximizes U (x, zxk ) + (σ/2) ε
x
k over the set of his ac-
quaintances, which are indexed by k. This induces an aggregate demand over the type
space. Indeed, it follows from the continuous logit theory initiated in Dagsvik (1994) that
the conditional probability density of an individual of type x of matching with a partner of
type x′ is
pi(x′|x) =
exp U(x,x
′)
σ/2∫
X exp
U(x, x′)
σ/2
dx′
. (2.2)
It is clear from expression (2.2) that this is a generalization of the logit framework to the
continuous case.
2.3. Equilibrium. Next, we introduce our equilibrium concept. Denote
Φ
(
x, x′
)
:= α
(
x, x′
)
+ α
(
x′, x
)
= U
(
x, x′
)
+ U
(
x′, x
)
the systematic part of the joint surplus6 between x and x′. It follows from (2.2) and
symmetry of pi that
(σ/2) lnpi
(
x, x′
)
= U(x, x′)− a (x) = U(x′, x)− a (x′) , (2.3)
where a(x) : =
σ
2
log
∫
X
1
f (x)
exp
U(x, x′)
σ/2
dx′. (2.4)
6Note that Φ is symmetric by definition, but α has no reason to be symmetric. Mathematically speaking,
Φ is (twice) the symmetric part of α.
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Substituting out for U in (2.3) yields the following equation, which expresses optimality
in individual decisions:
log pi
(
x, x′
)
=
Φ (x, x′)− a(x)− a(x′)
σ
, (2.5)
At equilibrium, the value of a (.) is determined by market-clearing condition
∫
X pi (x, x
′) dx′ =
f (x), that is ∫
X
exp
(
Φ (x, x′)− a(x)− a(x′)
σ
)
dx′ = f (x) . (2.6)
After all these preparations, we can define our equilibrium matching concept.
Definition 1. pi is an equilibrium matching if and only if there is a function a (.) such that
both optimality equations (2.5) and market clearing equations (2.6) are satisfied.
The main results on equilibrium characterization are summarized in the following state-
ment, whose proof is given below:
Theorem A. Under Assumptions 1 and 2:
(i) The equilibrium matching pi (x, x′) is the unique solution to
max
pi∈M(f,f)
∫∫
X×X
Φ(x, x′)pi(x, x′)dxdx′ − σE (pi) , (2.7)
where E (pi) is defined by
E (pi) =
∫∫
X×X
pi(x, x′) lnpi(x, x′)dxdx′. (2.8)
(ii) The expression of pi (x, x′) is given by
pi
(
x, x′
)
= exp
(
Φ (x, x′)− a(x)− a(x′)
σ
)
, (2.9)
where a (.) is a fixed point of F , which is given by
F [a] (x) = σ log
∫
X
exp
(
Φ (x, x′)− a(x′)
σ
)
dx′ − σ log f (x) . (2.10)
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Proof. By DG, Theorem 1, Problem (2.7) has a unique solution which can be expressed as
pi
(
x, x′
)
= exp
(
Φ (x, x′)− a (x)− b (x′)
σ
)
for some a (x) and b (x′) determined by pi ∈ M (f, f). By the symmetry of Φ and by the
symmetry of the constraints implied by pi ∈ M (f, f), then p˜i (x′, x) := pi (x, x′) is also
solution to (2.7). By uniqueness, p˜i = pi, thus pi (x, x′) = pi (x′, x). As a result, b (x) = a (x),
where a is determined by∫
exp
(
Φ (x, x′)− a (x)− a (x′)
σ
)
dx′ = f (x)
QED. 
This result deserves a number of comments. First, we should note that there is an interest-
ing interpretation of (2.7). While the first term inside the maximum tends to maximize the
sum of the observable joint surplus, and hence draws the solution toward assortativeness,
the second term E (pi) is an entropic term which draws the solution toward randomness.
The trade-off between assortativeness and randomness is expressed by the ratio Φ/σ. If
this ratio is large, the assortative term predominates, and the solution will be close to the
assortative solution. If this ratio is small, the entropic term predominates, and the solution
will be close to the random solution. At the same time, note that the model parameterized
by (Φ, σ) is scale-invariant: if k > 0, then the equilibrium matching distribution pi when the
parameter is (Φ, σ) is unchanged when the parameter is (kΦ, kσ). This will have important
consequences for identifications, which are discussed in the next paragraph.
As a consequence of this result, we can deduce the equilibrium transfers and the utilities
at equilibrium. Indeed, note that combining the expression of pi as a function of U and a
and Equation (2.5) yields the following expression of U as a function of a:
U(x, x′) =
(
Φ(x, x′) + a(x)− a(x′)) /2. (2.11)
which is the systematic part of utility that an individual of type x obtains at equilibrium
from a match with an individual of type x′. It is equal to the half of the joint surplus,
plus an adjustment (a(x)− a(x′))/2 which reflects the relative bargaining powers of x and
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x′. These bargaining powers depend on the relative scarcity of their types; indeed, a (x) is
to be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier of the scarcity constraint which imposes that
pi (., x) should sum to f (x). Hence, the equilibrium transfer τ (x, x′) from x to x′ is given
by
τ
(
x, x′
)
=
(
α(x′, x)− α (x, x′)+ a(x)− a(x′)) /2. (2.12)
Next, note that an interesting feature of Theorem A is that, while it characterizes equi-
librium in the homosexual marriage problem, it highlights at the same time the equivalence
with the heterosexual marriage problem: indeed, as argued in DG, Theorem 1, the equi-
librium matching in the heterosexual marriage problem is given by the same expression
as (2.7), with the only difference that M(f, f) is replaced by M(f, g), where f and g are
respectively the distribution of men and women’s characteristics.
We will use this characterization of the equilibrium matching as the solution of an opti-
mization problem in order to estimate the joint surplus Φ based on the observation of the
matching density pi. As it is classical in the literature on the estimation of matching models
with transferable utility, the primitive object of our investigations will be the joint surplus
Φ rather than the individual pre-transfer surplus α; indeed, without observations on the
transfers, Φ is identified but α is not. In other words, if we estimate that there is a high
level of joint surplus in the (x, x′) relationship, we will not be able to determine if this is
due to the fact that “x likes x′” or “x′ likes x”. We will only be able to estimate that there
is a high affinity between x and x′.
3. Estimation
3.1. Estimation of the affinity matrix. Following Dupuy and Galichon (2014), we as-
sume a quadratic parametrization of the surplus function Φ to focus on a limited number
of parameters which could characterize the matching pattern. We parametrize Φ by an
affinity matrix A so that
ΦA(x, y) = x
′Ay =
∑
ij
Aijx
iyj
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where A has to be symmetric (Aij = Aji) in order for Φ to satisfy the symmetry requirement.
Then the coefficients of the affinity matrix are given by Aij = ∂
2Φ(x, y)/∂xi∂yj at any
value (x, y). Matrix A has a straightforward interpretation: Aij is the marginal increase (or
decrease, according to the sign) in the joint surplus resulting from a one-unit increase in the
attribute i for the first partner, in conjunction with a one-unit increase in the attribute j for
the second. Hence, this approach is arguably the most straightforward one to model pairwise
positive or negative complementarities for any pair of characteristics. It does, however, not
preclude nonlinear functions of the xi’s and the yj ’s, which can always appended to x and
y.
Recall equation (2.7), the optimal matching pi maximizes the social gain
W(A) = max
pi∈M(f,f)
Epi
[
x′Ay
]− σEpi [lnpi(x, y)] (3.1)
which yields likelihood piA (x, x′) of observation (x, x′), where piA is the solution to (3.1). By
the Envelope theorem, ∂W(A)/∂Aij = EpiA
[
xiyj
]
. Hence, our empirical strategy, following
DG, is to look for Aˆ satisfying
∂W(A)/∂Aij = Epˆi
[
xiyj
]
, (3.2)
where pˆi is empirical distribution associated with the observed matching.
As noted before, the model with parameters (A, σ) is equivalent to the model with param-
eters (kA, kσ) for k > 0. Hence, a choice of scale normalization should be imposed without
loss of generality; a simple choice for single market observation is σ = 1, in which case
the estimator A is meant as the estimator of the ratio of the affinity matrix over the scale
parameter. The observation and comparison of multiple markets leads to slightly different
normalizations choices, which are discussed at the end of this section.
If a sample of size n {(x1, y1) , ..., (xn, yn)} is observed, then pˆi (x, y) = n−1
∑n
t=1 δ (x− xt) δ (y − yt).
In DG, an estimator of A is obtained by solving the following concave optimization problem
min
A∈MK
W(A)− Epˆi[
∑
ij
Aijx
iyj ], (3.3)
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where MK is the set of real K ×K matrices. Indeed, the first order conditions associated
to (3.3) is exactly given by (3.2). However, in the present case, symmetry of A is a require-
ment of the model. The population cross-covariance matrix Epi[xiyj ] is symmetric, as pi
satisfies the symmetry restriction pi (x, x′) = pi (x′, x) in the population. Yet, in the sample,
pˆi does not need to verify the symmetry restriction, as the first variable typically designates
the surveyed individual, while the second variable designates the partner of the surveyed
individual. Hence, the empirical matrix of co-moments Epˆi[xiyj ] will only be approximately
symmetric. Thus, we symmetrize the sample by adding the symmetric households, that is,
if household ij individual i was surveyed and reports partner j, we add a symmetric house-
hold ji as if the surveyed individual was j and had reported a partner i. In other words,
we replace the empirical distribution pˆi (x, x′) by its symmetric part (pˆi (x, x′) + pˆi (x′, x))/2.
In the sequel, pˆi will be denote that symmetric part. This leads us to propose the following
definition:
Definition 2. The estimator Aˆ of the affinity matrix is obtained by
Aˆ = arg min
A∈MK
{W(A)− Epˆi[
∑
1≤i,j≤K
AijX
iY j ]}, (3.4)
where MK is the set of real K ×K matrices.
3.2. Categorical variables. The previous analysis can be slighlty adapted to deal with
the case of categorical variables, such as race. Assume that the set of categories is denoted
R = {1, ..., r}. Assume that the individuals are characterized by x = (x˜, x¯1, ..., x¯r), where
x˜ ∈ RK are socio-economic characteristics, and x¯i (1 ≤ i ≤ r) is a dummy variable which is 1
if individual x is of category i, and zero otherwise. We work with the following specification
of the surplus
Φ (x, y) = x˜′A˜y˜ + λ1 {x¯ = y¯}
where λ is a term that reflects assortativeness on the categorical variable, which provides
a utility increment λ if the partners belong to the same category. Of course, this surplus
function can be expressed multiplicatively as Φ (x, y) = x′Ay, where A can be written
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blockwise as
A =
A˜ 0
0 λIr
 (3.5)
and hence, A is obtained by running optimization problem (3.4) subject to constraint (3.5).
Note that the envelope theorem implies that λ is indentified by the moment matching
condition
Prpi (x¯ = y¯) = Prpˆi (x¯ = y¯)
which states that the predicted frequency of interracial couples should match the observed
one.
3.3. Saliency analysis. The rank of the affinity matrix is informative about the dimen-
sionality of the problem, that is, how many indices are needed to explain the sorting in this
market. To answer this question, DG introduced saliency analysis, which consists in look-
ing for successive approximations of the K-dimensional matching market by p-dimensional
matching markets (p ≤ K). Assume (without loss of generality as one can always rescale)
that var (Xi) = var (Yj) = 1. Then saliency analysis consists of a singular value decompo-
sition of the affinity matrix A = U ′ΛV , where U and V are orthogonal loading matrices,
and Λ is diagonal with positive and decreasing coefficients on the diagonal. This idea is
found in Heckman (2007), who interprets the assignment matrix as a sum of Cobb-Douglas
technologies using a singular value decomposition in order to refine bounds on wages. This
allows to introduce new indices x˜ = Ux and y˜ = V y which are orthogonal transforms of the
former, and such that the joint surplus reflects diagonal interactions of the new indices, i.e.
Φ (x, y) = x′U ′ΛV y = x˜Λy˜.
Here, we need to slightly adapt this idea to take advantage of the symmetry of A and
of the requirement that the matrix of loadings U and V should be identical. The natural
solution is the eigenvalue decomposition of A, which leads to the existence of an orthogonal
loading matrix U and a diagonal Λ = diag (λi) with nonincreasing (but not necessarily
positive) coefficients on the diagonal such that
A = U ′ΛU.
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This allows us to introduce a new vector of indices x˜ = Ux and y˜ = Uy, which are orthogonal
transforms of the previous indices. That way, the joint surplus between individuals x and
y is given by
Φ (x, y) = x′U ′ΛUy = x˜′Λy˜ =
K∑
p=1
λpx˜
py˜p
hence this term only reflects pairwise interactions of dimension p of x˜ and y˜, which are
either complements (if λp > 0) or substitute (if λp < 0), and there are no complementarities
across different dimensions.
The following statement formalizes this finding:
Theorem B. Assume that Epˆi [X] = 0 and that varpˆi
(
Xi
)
= 1 for all i. Then there exists
an orthogonal loading matrix Uˆ and a diagonal Λˆ = diag (λi) with nonincreasing coefficients
on the diagonal such that
Aˆ = Uˆ ′ΛˆUˆ
and, denoting x˜ = Uˆx and y˜ = Uˆy, the estimator of the surplus function is given by
Φˆ (x, y) = x˜′Λˆy˜ =
K∑
p=1
λpx˜
py˜p.
Proof. Because Aˆ is symmetric, it has the following eigenvalue decomposition
Aˆ = Uˆ ′ΛˆUˆ
where Uˆ is orthogonal, and Λˆ = diag (λi) is diagonal with nonincreasing coefficients. De-
noting x˜ = Uˆx and y˜ = Uˆy,
x′Ay = x′Uˆ ′ΛˆUˆy = x˜′Λˆy˜ =
K∑
p=1
λpx˜
py˜p.

In the presence of categorical variables, the presence of a block λIr reflecting assortative-
ness on the categorical variable in the expression (3.5) implies that the singular values of A
in (3.5) will be the singular values of A in addition to λ with multiplicity r. Therefore, it
is recommended to perform Saliency Analysis simply on the upper left block A.
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3.4. Comparison across markets. Affinity matrices are a useful tool to analyze the
marital surplus. It is very tempting to use them to compare different markets. In the present
context, we would like to compare the structure of marital surplus across the homosexual
and heterosexual marriage markets. A caveat is, however, in order. Indeed, recall from the
above discussion that A and σ are not identified individually, but A/σ is identified; the
expression of the total surplus in a given market, namely
W (A, σ) = Epi
[
X ′AY
]− σEpi [lnpi (X,Y )]
is scale invariant. However, for cross-market comparison purposes, the normalization σ = 1
which we have adopted so far can be misleading, as it assumes that the standard deviation
of the heterogenity in preferences is the same across all markets considered. This is not a
very satisfying assumption. For comparison purposes, it seems plausible to work under the
different assumption that the total quantity of surplusW (A, σ) is the same across markets.
That is:
Assumption 3. Assume that the average surplus on each market is the same, that is
W (A, σ) is the same across every market.
Assumption 3 allows for comparison of affinity matrices across markets. Other assump-
tions would be possible; for instance, one could assume that σ is the same across markets;
or that E [X ′AY ] is the same across markets. However, the observable characteristics may
weight more or less in the sum of social welfare across markets, and it seems more plausible
to assume that the overall quantity of welfare is the same, even though the breakdown ob-
servable/unobservable may vary. Assumption 3 then allows us to impose the normalization
W (A, σ) = Wref on each market. Therefore, in each market, we shall determine the scale
k such that W (kA, k) = Wref , that is k = Wref/W(A, 1). Thus, instead of the estimator
Aˆ given by (3.4), we shall use Aˆ/W(Aˆ, 1).
4. Data
4.1. Data on same-sex couples. Empirical studies on homosexuality have traditionally
needed to cope with poor data, due to the late legal recognition of their partnerships – still
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unachieved in several countries – and with misreporting issues, due to social pressure on
respondents7. Social scientists have largely relied on the data collected by the US Census
Bureau for large-scale analysis of homosexuality issues (Jepsen and Jepsen, 2002; Black,
Sanders, and Taylor, 2007; Schwartz and Graf, 2009). Starting from the 1990 decennial
census, individuals could report themselves as “unmarried partner” within the household,
regardless of their sex, so that homosexual couples could be identified. In more recent
databases from the US Census Bureau, homosexual couples are still identifiable as out-of-
marriage cohabiting partners. Indeed, although same-sex marriages have been officiated
in some American states since 2004, they were recognized at federal level only in 2013,
and currently available surveys conducted by the Census Bureau do not allow reporting
marriage bonds other than the heterosexual one.
Several researchers soon realized the inaccuracy of the US Census Bureau data on ho-
mosexual couples. In particular, Black, Gates, Sanders, and Taylor (2007); DeMaio, Bates,
and O’Connell (2013) and O’Connell and Gooding (2006) point out the unreliability of the
2000 decennial Census. Going back to the 1990 Census, if respondents declared themselves
of the same sex and a married couple at one time, the answer was tagged as illogical and
the sex of the householder’s partner was automatically allocated by the Bureau. However,
it was argued that some homosexual couples voluntarily declared themselves as being mar-
ried if their partnership concretely resembled a marriage bond. Therefore, the 1990 Census
would underestimate the number of homosexual couple households.
In the 2000 decennial Census, the Bureau adopted a different allocation strategy in order
to improve the accuracy in measuring of homosexual households. In case of a questionnaire
reporting a same-sex married couple, while sex variables were not touched any more, the
marital status variable was now switched to “unmarried couple”8. However, a relatively
7Underreporting is a serious issue in the study of same-sex couple (Coffman, Coffman, and Ericson, 2013)
and could be a potential problem for our analysis if it causes the available sample to be biased with respect
to the homosexual population. While presenting our work, we were suggested that an analysis of sorting
patterns of households with only two roommates of the same sex could shed some light on the persistence
of underreporting.
8In 2000, homosexual marriage had not been introduced in any state yet. Later on, the same strategy has
been kept, since homosexual marriage was not recognized at Federal level. This provision has specifically
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small measurement error in the whole population for one variable can significantly gener-
ate misclassification issues for small subgroups. In the 2000 Census case, a large share9 of
the same-sex married couples turned out to be different-sex ones that wrongly compiled
the questionnaire. As a result, estimates on the number of homosexual couple households
turned out to be inflated. Since in the database it is possible to identify through an alloca-
tion flag variable those individuals whose marital status has been reallocated by the Bureau,
it has been advised to exclude such observations from samples for studies on homosexuality,
sometimes significantly reducing the sample size (e.g. in Schwartz and Graf (2009)). Be-
sides, some studies argue that similar flaws affect other US Census Bureau datasets, notably
the 2005-2007 American Community Survey (ACS) (Gates and Steinberger, 2009) and the
2010 decennial Census (DeMaio, Bates, and O’Connell, 2013).
To tackle this issue, the US Census Bureau implemented some improvements in the ques-
tionnaire layout and in the data editing tools, in order to minimize measurement errors on
the sex of heterosexual couple partners (see US Census Bureau (2013) for further explana-
tions). Such changes resulted in a sharp decline in the estimates on homosexual couples
between 2007 and 2008, a consequence of an increase in accuracy (Gates, 2009; DeMaio,
Bates, and O’Connell, 2013)10. Therefore, though not flawless, the ACS data gathered since
2008 represent the best available database among those provided by the Census Bureau to
study homosexuality issues.
Accordingly, the present work relies on the five-year Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS)
for 2008-2012 coming from the ACS, conducted by the US Census Bureau. We restricted
our sample to the state of California, which first legalized same-sex marriage on June 16,
2008 following a Supreme Court of California decision, and then - after some judicial and
been imposed since 1996 by the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) (DeMaio, Bates, and O’Connell,
2013).
9About three quarters of the same-sex married couples were actually different-sex married couples (Black,
Gates, Sanders, and Taylor, 2007; Gates and Steinberger, 2009).
10DeMaio, Bates, and O’Connell (2013) use 2010 ACS data as a benchmark to show the inaccuracy of
2010 decennial Census data, which are collected with the older methodology.
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political controversies that impeded the officialization of same-sex weddings from Novem-
ber 5, 2008 to June 27, 201311- another decision of the Supreme Court finally accomplished
full legalization. Restricting the sample to one state allows focusing on a marriage market
undergoing a uniform judicial framework. Moreover, in states where same-sex marriage
is recognized, estimates on the number of married same-sex couple households are more
reliable, i.e. the incidence of the measurement error is smaller (Gates, 2010; Virgile, 2011).
The sample is limited to those individuals involved in a cohabiting partnership, both
married and unmarried, thus excluding singles but also couples whose partners live far from
each other. Each couple is identified as a householder with his/her partner, where both
share the same ID household number.
Furthermore, we restrict the number of couples to those where both partners are between
25 and 50 in age and exclude those who have not completed their studies yet. The pat-
terns of observed couple characteristics are subject to attribute changes over time and to
a selection effect through partnership dissolution (Schwartz and Graf, 2009). The PUMS
cross-sectional data allows describing a static situation in a fixed point in time, without fol-
lowing couples over time. It is therefore appropriate to restrict the sample to those couples
that formed recently to limit the effects of time variations. In addition, Alexander, Davern,
and Stevenson (2010) call attention to the correctness of US Census Bureau gender data
for individuals aged 65 or older: since the gender dummy is crucial in the construction of
the sample, excluding the elderly should boost the reliability of the data.
4.2. Descriptive statistics. The main database is composed of 681,060 individuals in
couples who have completed their schooling. The restriction to prime age couples (25-50
year old) reduces our sample to 285,546 individuals. 3,654 couples (1.28% of the sample)
live in same-sex couples, of which 2,034 live in male couples (0.71 %) and 1,620 live in
female couples (0.57 %). 87.39% of the sample are married heterosexuals and 11.33 % are
cohabiting heterosexuals. For estimation purposes, after randomly selecting a subsample of
11In this period, marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples held their validity.
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the different-sex couples set12, a total of 9,820 couples are considered, of which 4,959 are
married and 4,799 are not.
To compare different marriage markets, following Jepsen and Jepsen (2002), the main
sample is divided into four subsamples: same-sex male couples, same-sex female couples,
different-sex unmarried couples and different-sex married couples. This repartition is based
on the assumption that individuals enter into separate markets according to their sexuality.
However, another criterion is used to differentiate two of the subgroups: married and un-
married heterosexual couples are treated as two separate subpopulations13, since empirical
evidence has reported significant differences in patterns between these two kinds of part-
nership (Jepsen and Jepsen, 2002; Schwartz and Graf, 2009). Although it is impossible
to know a priori if a person is interested in a marital union rather than in a less binding
relationship, this repartition can be of great interest and deepen the analysis. Nevertheless,
even if California represents the larger state-level ACS sample in the US, further splitting
the male and female homosexual groups into two parts unfortunately implies working with
relatively small samples. Moreover, although same-sex marriage is permitted, it has been
recognized only recently and at the end of many legal struggles, which may have prevented
a part of those same-sex couples that wished to marry from doing so. Whenever the num-
ber of registered homosexual partnerships increased and the share of married couples were
known with more certainty, then considering married and unmarried homosexual couples
separately would be extremely interesting, as proved by recent research of Verbakel and
Kalmijn (2014).
This study takes into consideration several variables, some related to the labor market and
some others to the general background. Non-labor market traits include age, education and
race. Age and education are treated as continuous variables, with the latter defined as the
highest schooling level attained by the individual. Thanks to the detailed data of the ACS,
the variable has been built in order to reflect as many distinguished educational stages
12We randomly select 4% of married couples and 30% of unmarried couples.
13See Mourifie´ and Siow (2014) for a very interesting discussion of the endogenous choice of the form of
marital relationship.
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as possible. As considers race and ethnicity, we consider five large racial/ethnic groups:
Non-Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black, Non-Hispanic Asian, Hispanic and Others14.
Finally, among labor market variables, we compute and include hourly wage15. Note that
yearly wage is top-coded for very high values (over $999,999). Moreover, the usual amount
of hours worked per week is included.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of our sample. Individuals in same-sex couples
are on average more educated than individuals in opposite-sex couples. As observed by
Black, Sanders, and Taylor (2007), young homosexual women are much more likely to be
part of the labor force than heterosexual ones and also have higher wages. We observe
that unmarried heterosexual couples are much younger than married couples and same-
sex couples. Among the 25-50 year-old, unmarried heterosexual men and women are on
average four year younger than others. Cohabitation is often (but not always) a “trial”
period before marriage, which explains the age difference. Table 2 presents the distribution
of ethnics among couples: same-sex couples are much more present among White people,
whereas there is a remarkably high share of Black individuals among lesbian couples. On
the contrary, Asians and Hispanics are under-represented in the homosexual population.
Table 3 presents the correlation rates among traits. It shows that age and education
attainment are much more correlated among heterosexual couples than among homosexual
ones. Moreover, the correlation is stronger for lesbian couples than for gay ones. Education
is also more correlated among young couples than among older ones. Correlations or labor
market outcomes are particularly interesting: hours worked are negatively correlated only
for different-sex couples, a possible clue of stronger household specialization, whereas the
14American demographic institutions do not include a Hispanic category in variables on race, furnishing
a separate variable for Hispanic origins, which is why there is some overlapping and the other categories bear
the specification ”Non-Hispanic”. The issue concerns the conceptual differences of ”race” and ”ethnicity”.
See for instance Rodriguez (2000) for clarifications.
15The variable is computed as follows: we divide yearly wage by 52 in order to have the average weekly
wage for last year and then we divide it again by the usual number of hours worked per week, which is
available in the dataset. The hourly wage is partly approximated because the exact number of weeks worked
in the last 12 months is not available.
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correlation is low and positive for same-sex couples. On the other hand, wages display
a positive correlation in every market, with male same-sex couples exhibiting the lowest
correlation.
Table 4, 5 and 6 present the homogamy rates of couples with respect to race for different
types of couples. The homogamy rate is the ratio between the observed number of couples
of a certain type and the counterfactual number which should be observed if individuals
formed couples randomly16. For instance, Table 4 shows that lesbian couples among black
women form 10 times much more than if they were formed randomly among the lesbian
population.
5. Results
Homogamy rates and correlations presented in section 4 are interesting measures of as-
sortative mating and provide a good starting point for our analysis. However, no conclusion
on preferences can be drawn from their observation. In fact, as it was already noted by
Becker (1973), we need to know how specific traits interact when all the others are held
constant. Our structural approach allows to analyze the degree of assortativeness for each
couple of traits ceteris paribus.
Moreover, bear in mind that, since we directly estimate the parameters of the systematic
surplus function contained in our matching model, it is implied that differences in assor-
tative mating reveal a different structure of preferences. We interpret assortativeness as a
consequence of the structure of the household production function - as meant by Becker
(1973) - rather than as a consequence of search dynamics (notably, geographic factors and
search frictions).
We report in appendix the estimates of the affinity matrix for male homosexuals in Table
7, for female homosexuals in Table 12, for cohabiting heterosexuals in Table 17 and for
married heterosexuals in Table 21.
16If couples formed randomly across the population, the number of couples between a man of type i and
a woman of type j would be equal to ni.n.j/N . The homogamy rate is then the ratio of the observed number
of couples on this theoretical number of couples. See Vanderschelden (2006).
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5.1. Age, education and race/ethnicity. First of all, our estimates of the diagonal
elements of the affinity matrices are highly positive and significant for age, education and
ethnicity, which strongly confirms the positive assortative mating observed in the literature.
The complementarity in these non-labor market traits is once again empirically assessed. In
line with the results by Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) and Schwartz and Graf (2009), we find that
heterosexuals have a stronger preference for homogamy with respect to age and ethnicity.
Nonetheless, our structural estimation reveals that sorting on education is stronger on the
same-sex marriage market.
Going into detail, we find that the intensity of both affinity by age and preference for
ethnic homogamy are the lowest for male same-sex couples (both equal to 0.64). We observe
intermediate values for female same-sex couples (0.81 for age, 1.30 for ethnicity) and un-
married different-sex couples (1.19, 1.97), whereas married different-sex couples exhibit the
strongest homogamous preferences (2.25, 2.42). Contrarily, education plays a more relevant
role on homosexual marriage markets: complementarity of schooling levels is the strongest
for lesbian couples (1.23), followed by gay couples (0.87). Affinity by education is weaker
for married heterosexuals (0.85) and is the lowest for unmarried heterosexuals (0.66).
Our estimates on the level of educational sorting not only contradicts previous find-
ings, but seem at odds with the theoretical predictions formulated by the social sciences
literature17 that homosexuals have a weaker preference for socio-economic homogamy. Nev-
ertheless, one possible explanation to our unexpected result may be found in childrearing
patterns: heterosexuals, who are more likely to have children18, may be more specialized
also with respect to education. As we discuss in the next section, the household specializa-
tion process should mainly concern labor-market variables. Nonetheless, it is possible that,
in different-sex couples, one spouse - typically the wife - may be more likely to give up on
her studies in anticipation of her role of child-bearer.
17The main reference works about mating among homosexuals are listed in our introduction. We refer
to Schwartz and Graf (2009) and Verbakel and Kalmijn (2014) who, drawing from literatures from different
social sciences, both provide a complete and updated review on this topic
18In our sample, among the 25-50 years-old, 14.5% of gays have children, 37.8% of lesbians, 58.04% of
cohabiting different-sex couples and 83.5% of married different sex couples.
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In order to ease the interpretation of our findings, we also estimate the affinity matrix
considering only childless couples as a robustness check19 (tables 11, 16, 24 and 20). Inter-
estingly, we find that, with respect to age and ethnicity, both childless homosexuals and
heterosexuals have weaker homogamous preferences than their respective counterparts with
children. It seems therefore that those individuals who plan to have children look for a
more similar partner than those who do not. On the contrary, sorting on education is
stronger for childless couples and the former “ranking” on complementarity in education
is reversed. Childless married heterosexuals exhibit the strongest taste for educational ho-
mogamy (1.11), followed by lesbians (0.94), unmarried heterosexuals (0.92) and gays (0.67).
In addition, complementarity in education drops to 0.89 for married same-sex couples with
only one child and to 0.69 for those with three children (tables 25 and 26). These additional
findings support the previous observation that complementarity in education is weaker on
marriage markets where childrearing plays a more relevant role.
5.2. Labor market traits. To describe labor market traits, we must be very cautious as
these outcomes are potentially endogenous. Since we do not observe these traits at the
moment of the match formation but possibly much later, the specialization process at work
in couples may have already begun. In particular, we expect that this specialization effect is
strong in heterosexual couples, who are more likely to have children20. Raising children takes
time and most of mothers leave the labor force or reduce their working hours. Consequently,
because of interrupted careers and less paid part-time jobs, their hourly wage does not rise
as much as that of their male counterparts and we observe many associations between
low-wage women and high-wage men. This phenomenon could bias our estimates and we
cannot interpret them directly as preference estimates. However, the differences we observe
19We are aware that this is an “artificial” marriage market, since it does not make much sense to state
that couples with children formed on a different market. However, our model does not have a specification
that explicitly accounts for choices related to childbearing.
20Antecol and Steinberger (2013) and Jepsen and Jepsen (2015) showed that to a lesser extent some
household specialization also exists within same-sex households. Moreover, Antecol and Steinberger (2013)
stress that childless different-sex couples are less specialized and thus more similar to same-sex couples
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between the estimates for our four types of couples help us to shed light on the specialization
effect, as we now argue.
First, we observe a significant positive assortative mating on hourly wages for all types
of couples although the coefficient is higher for same-sex couples (0.06) and for unmarried
couples (0.12) than for married heterosexual couples (0.03). Furthermore, we do not observe
positive assortative mating on working hours for married heterosexual couples, whereas we
observe much higher and significant positive estimates for same-sex couples (0.21 for female
same-sex couples and 0.12 for male same-sex couples). The coefficient for unmarried couples
is also positive and significant (0.10). As unmarried couples are more often young couples,
these estimates must be much closer to the true preference estimates as the specialization
process has not had time to happen yet21. Estimates must also identify preference parame-
ters for same-sex couples as homosexuals are less likely to have children and consequently
have weaker incentives to specialize. When estimating our model on childless couples, we
find that married childless couples have a much higher and significant coefficient for both
wage (0.14) and working hours (0.19). Our results are in line with those of Jepsen and
Jepsen (2015). It is worth noting that the estimate for working hours is much higher for
lesbians than for gays. Homosexual women may prefer a partner with similar time schedule.
The cross-estimate between the wage of one partner and working hours of the other
partner is also very interesting to analyze, although we may not be able to interpret it as
a preference parameter. Instead, it must represent the well-known income effect at work in
couples: when the wage of an individual rises, the household’s income rises and the partner
of this individual is free to work less. The estimate is highly negative for homosexual
women (-0.20) and heterosexual married women (-0.14). It is also negative and significant
for homosexual men (-0.07) and heterosexual married men (-0.18). It seems that same-sex
couples and married couples coordinate they labor supply: they pool a part of their income
21Unmarried couples can also be long dating couples who do not want to marry ever. Still, in that case,
the specialization is not as strong as in married couples, since they might not commit to the community as
strongly as married individuals.
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and adjust their work in reaction to variations of the labor market traits of their partner22.
However, the coefficient is non-significant for unmarried couples. As unmarried couples are
on average younger, their income effect is weaker since they do not pool their income yet
and are more likely to stay financially independent from their respective partners.
5.3. Cross-interactions and symmetry. Other significant positive cross-effects have been
found for some elements of the affinity matrix that lie off the diagonal. The parameter cap-
turing the interaction between wage and education is persistently high and positive. This
suggests that higher wage individuals have a preference for more educated partners, keeping
constant their wage and all other characteristics. Once again, same-sex couples exhibit the
weakest affinity between these two variables (0.13 for gays and 0.20 for lesbians). Com-
plementarity between the two inputs is stronger for unmarried and married heterosexuals,
but both markets exhibit asymmetry in this cross-interaction: for married couples, a joint
increase of husband’s wage and wife’s education generates higher surplus than the other way
around (0.47 against 0.38), whereas the opposite holds for unmarried couples (0.27 against
0.52). The complementarity between the two inputs can be explained in two ways. First
of all, as a matter of preferences, in that high-income individuals - independently of their
educational level - may enjoy the company of cultured partners, whereas the latter benefit
from matching with a partner with a high wage. A second possible explanation is related to
the impact of endogenous labor market choices on these estimates. A positive association of
wage and education might simply resemble the complementarity between partners’ wages,
especially when one of them is younger and has just entered the job market. Similarly,
we might have that one partner quits the labor market (for instance, after having a child)
despite his/her earning potential ensured by a relatively high schooling level.
Another cross-interaction that arises from the estimation is the substitutability between
age and hours worked on same-sex marriage markets (the estimates are equal to -0.14
for gays and -0.10 for lesbians). This interaction might be looked at as the equilibrium
outcome of the family’s bargaining dynamics, as explained by Oreffice (2011): younger
22Other similarities between same-sex couples and heterosexual couples household dynamic has also been
found in Oreffice (2011), in which the author shows that individuals in same-sex couples bargain over the
income as heterosexuals and respond to bargaining power shifts.
LIKE ATTRACT LIKE? 29
partners enjoy higher bargaining power and thus can afford reducing their labor supply.
Interestingly, unmarried different-sex couples exhibit similar patterns, although the effect
is weaker and present only in one direction: women can afford reducing their labor supply
when cohabiting with older partners, while men cannot. We observe exactly the same
patterns for married different-sex couples only when we consider the subsample of childless
couples, whereas on the whole different-sex marriage market we observe an opposite trend:
older married women are optimally matched with men that are ready to increase their labor
supply, a pattern that may be also linked with childrearing.
Finally, as a last robustness check for our main results, we estimate a bipartite matching
model of the same-sex marriage market (tables 10 and 15). The purpose of this exercise
is to understand whether the resulting affinity matrix is symmetric when symmetry is not
required by the model. However, note that, to run a bipartite estimation, we need to define
two separate subpopulations. On one side of the market, we group all those homosexuals
that are registered as “householders”, whereas on the other we group their “cohabiting
partners”. This repartition is highly artificial, since it implies that two homosexuals that
are householders before finding a partner can never match: in general, it seems implausible
to divide the same-sex population in two separate subgroups with the data that we have at
hand. Nonetheless, it is interesting to check - under the strict assumption of predetermined
roles - whether some asymmetry in cross-interactions occurs. We observe that the affinity
matrices for both male and female homosexuals (respectively Tables 10 and 15) are not much
different than in the unipartite case23. The main exception is the cross-interaction between
age and hours: for gays, the interaction appears only in one direction, with relatively
young cohabiting partners that can reduce their labor supply when matching with an older
householder. The effect is only present in the opposite direction in lesbian couples: it is
now relatively young householders that benefit from a shift in bargaining power.
5.4. Matching on unobservables. Thanks to our identification assumption, we can eval-
uate the parameter σ for each market. As anticipated in section 2, this parameter has a
simple interpretation: the higher σ, the more the matching appears as random to the
23We do not run a formal test, although this would be possible and possibly very useful in other situations.
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econometrician. Since our observable characteristics are meant to capture the main socio-
economic traits, we expect that a higher σ implies that mating is less “deterministic”: in-
deed, we expect that, for higher σ, the socio-economic background of an individual matters
relatively less, whereas other unobservable traits (e.g. personality or physical appearance)
may matter relatively more.
We find that σ is higher on same-sex marriage markets (1.22 for gays and 1.19 for les-
bians), whereas it is lower on different-sex marriage markets (1.03 for unmarried couples and
0.98). Hence, it seems that socio-economic background matters more among heterosexuals,
and even more among those who are married.
5.5. Saliency analysis. A way to bring further insights to the main drivers of preferences
of individuals over different characteristics is to decompose the affinity matrix in orthogonal
dimensions. As detailed in the estimation part we will do the decomposition analysis on
all variables but race. We present such decomposition in the appendix in Tables 8, 9, 13,
14, 18, 19, 22 and 23. In the four markets, we show that more than 90% of the joint
surplus left could be explained in two orthogonal dimensions that we could name “indices
of attractiveness” as in DG. These indices load on different characteristics of individuals.
For all markets, the first index is almost only composed of age. It explains by itself around
50-60% of the surplus. Then the second dimension of sorting relies mostly on education for
all markets and explains around 30-40%.
When we consider heterosexual couples, the indices of mutual attractiveness could differ
between genders. For married heterosexual individuals, the education/wage index (second
dimension) loads positively twice as much on wages for men than for women, whereas there
is a penalty on working hours for women that does not appear for men.
Separately, we compute the share of the systematic part of the total surplus that is
attributable to race (table 27). We find this share reaches more than 45% for heterosexual
couples, 42% for lesbian couples and only 33% for gays.
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6. Discussion and perspectives
The contributions of the present paper are twofold. From a methodological point of view,
this paper is the first to propose a tractable theoretical framework for same-sex marriage.
Our methodology could be applied to many other markets (e.g. roommates, teammates,
co-workers). In addition, we apply the model in order to provide an empirical analysis of
mating preferences in the same-sex marriage market in California. We conduct a cross-
market comparison: we analyze the heterogeneity in preferences between homosexual and
heterosexual couples. First, we find that, as concerns age and ethnicity, the heterosexual
population has a stronger “preference for homogamy” than the homosexual one, whereas
the inverse is true as concerns sorting on education. Second, we discuss the differences
in complementarity and substitutability of inputs in the household production function
as defined in the theory of the family put forward by Gary Becker. Our findings seem
to suggest that labor market traits are substitutes for married heterosexual couples but
complementary for other types of couples. This result challenges the traditional concept of
the marriage gain based on specialization within the couple.
The need for effective analytical frameworks to study and describe relatively modern
forms of families has recently emerged in the economic literature, both as concerns same-sex
couples (Black, Sanders, and Taylor, 2007; Oreffice, 2011) and cohabiting partners (Steven-
son and Wolfers, 2007; Gemici and Laufer, 2011). In this paper, we first identified three
separate subpopulations according to sexual preferences, and then we separately analyzed
the matching of married couples and of unmarried ones. We found preferences disparities
between the four markets. However, can we state with certainty that these markets are
mutually exclusive? In fact, individuals may first endogenously choose into which market
they are willing to match. Moreover, there could be spillovers between markets.
In this paper, we show that simple cohabitation and marriage correspond to different
preferences for mating and household organization, which is what has also been observed in
the literature (Schwartz and Graf, 2009; Gemici and Laufer, 2011; Verbakel and Kalmijn,
2014). Cohabitation is a developing phenomenon and is associated with a lower degree
of specialization and a lower degree of positive assortative mating. A promising area of
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research would be to understand the preferences for marriage or cohabitation jointly with
sorting preferences. Mourifie´ and Siow (2014) set a first model in that direction for het-
erosexual couples. An empirical paper of Verbakel and Kalmijn (2014) separately analyzes
the marriage and cohabitation markets in Netherlands also for homosexuals. In the same
vein, Alde´n, Edlund, Hammarstedt, and Mueller-Smith (2013) study the implications of
the legal recognition of same-sex unions on fertility and labor market outcomes of homo-
sexuals. With the consolidation of the same-sex marriage and the availability of more and
more accurate data, it will soon be possible to expand our understanding of differences and
similarities across markets. Families and household arrangements are evolving quickly and
we need to understand the underlying forces of these changes.
One issue that needs to be investigated is the possible presence of spillovers between mar-
kets. Many opponents of same-sex marriage fear that it will cause the marriage institution
to lose its value and favor alternative forms of families, typically more flexible/less stable,
such as cohabitation. For now, researchers have found no effect of same-sex marriage on
the number of different-sex marriages or on the number of divorces (Trandafir, 2014, 2015).
However, we wonder whether the legal recognition of same-sex marriage could someway
impact the preferences observed on the different markets. What changes should we expect
in the behavior of heterosexuals? And could it be that same-sex couples become more
homogamous as homosexual marriage is institutionalized?
Finally, in Becker’s theory, a rationale for marriage is the home production complemen-
tarities between men and women skills. However, the traditional gains from marriage have
diminished for two main reasons. First, the progress in home technology has decreased
the value of domestic production; second, as women took control over their fertility and
have been getting more and more educated, their opportunity cost to stay at home has
increased (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007; Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos, 2012).
Despite the decrease in the traditional marriage gains, the institution of marriage has not
disappeared. On the contrary, there has been a high demand for same-sex legal marriage
in many developed countries. Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) argue that individuals now
look for a mate with whom they “share passions” and the new rationale for marriage is
now “consumption complementarities” instead of “production complementarities”. It is
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also possible that the act of marriage itself is still considered as intrinsically valuable for
cultural and social reasons. In any case, this evolution may lead to even higher correlation
of traits. Time will tell how these changes will impact macroeconomic outcomes, life quality
and social distance among individuals.
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics
Type of couples Age Education Wage∗ Hours Sample size Share
All
Married Heterosexuals
Men 53.14 12.42 31.24 42.26 306798 90.09 %
Women 50.49 12.28 22.56 35.76 306798
Unmarried Heterosexuals
Men 41.54 11.39 19.48 40.74 29058 8.53 %
Women 39.87 11.63 18.02 37.57 29058
Homosexuals
Men 49.99 13.82 33.45 40.94 5197 0.76 %
Women 50.00 13.69 28.35 39.92 4150 0.61 %
25-50 year old
Married Heterosexuals
Men 40.22 12.33 31.34 43.60 124772 87.39 %
Women 38.37 12.47 22.84 36.16 124772
Unmarried Heterosexuals
Men 36.31 11.17 19.79 41.33 16174 11.33 %
Women 34.84 11.55 18.45 38.30 16174
Homosexuals
Men 40.00 13.93 35.19 42.71 2034 0.71 %
Women 39.35 13.78 28.44 40.74 1620 0.57 %
Table 1: Sample means
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Ethnic Heterosexual Gay Lesbian All
White 42.7 67.3 63.5 43.0
Black 2.9 2.5 5.2 2.9
Others 0.6 0.8 1.2 0.6
Asian 16.7 8.8 5.8 16.6
Hispanic 37.1 20.7 24.3 36.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 2: Race (25-50 year old)
Type of couples Age Education Wage Hours
All
Heterosexual couples 0.82 0.55 0.11 -0.02
Gay couples 0.58 0.31 0.05 0.07
Lesbian couples 0.66 0.34 0.20 0.07
25-50 year old
Heterosexual couples 0.76 0.70 0.17 -0.10
Gay couples 0.56 0.56 0.15 0.03
Lesbian couples 0.66 0.65 0.20 0.08
Table 3: Couple correlations
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White Black Others Asian Hispanic
White 1,28 0,39 0,74 0,70 0,47
Black 0,39 10,67 1,00 0,82 0,53
Others 0,74 1,00 20,00 0,91 0,87
Asian 0,70 0,82 0,91 8,00 0,13
Hispanic 0,47 0,53 0,87 0,13 2,69
Table 4: Homogamy rates of lesbians (25-50 year old)
White Black Others Asian Hispanic
White Black Others Asian Hispanic
White 1,12 0,79 0,46 0,94 0,67
Black 0,79 12,31 0,00 0,44 0,57
Others 0,46 0,00 40,00 2,14 1,21
Asian 0,94 0,44 2,14 3,08 0,33
Hispanic 0,67 0,57 1,21 0,33 2,39
Table 5: Homogamy rates of gays (25-50 year old)
Women
Men White Black Others Asian Hispanic
White 1,96 0,32 0,87 0,37 0,28
Black 0,49 24,02 1,38 0,34 0,36
Others 0,84 0,62 60,91 0,40 0,46
Asian 0,15 0,08 0,27 5,08 0,07
Hispanic 0,26 0,16 0,44 0,09 2,32
Table 6: Homogamy rates of heterosexuals (25-50 year old)
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Appendix B. Gays
Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 0.64 -0.06 -0.02 -0.14 0.00
Education -0.06 0.87 0.13 -0.07 0.00
Wage -0.02 0.13 0.05 -0.07 0.00
Hours -0.14 -0.07 -0.07 0.12 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64
σ 1.22
Table 7: Affinity matrix for gays (25-50 year old, 1,017 couples)
I1 I2 I3 I4
Share of surplus 54.07 37.31 7.88 0.74
(Standard deviation) (3.39) (3.65) (1.84) (2.12)
Table 8: Shares of systematic surplus for gays (25-50 year old, 1,017 couples)
I1 I2 I3
Age 0.97 -0.11 0.16
Education -0.15 -0.94 0.30
Wage -0.04 -0.27 -0.59
Hours -0.19 0.19 0.74
Table 9: Indices of attractiveness for gays (25-50 year old, 1,017 couples)
42 CISCATO, GALICHON, AND GOUSSE´
Partner
Head Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 0.62 -0.06 -0.00 -0.17 0.00
Education 0.00 0.83 0.12 -0.02 0.00
Wage -0.01 0.16 0.06 -0.07 0.00
Hours -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.11 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67
σ 1.32
Table 10: Affinity matrix from bipartite estimation for gays (25-50 year old, 1,017 couples)
Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 0.58 -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 0.00
Education -0.08 0.67 0.11 -0.02 0.00
Wage -0.04 0.11 0.06 -0.07 0.00
Hours -0.11 -0.02 -0.07 0.18 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.47
σ 1.26
Table 11: Affinity matrix for childless gays (25-50 year old, 870 couples)
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Appendix C. Lesbians
Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 0.81 0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.00
Education 0.04 1.23 0.20 -0.01 0.00
Wage 0.05 0.20 0.06 -0.19 0.00
Hours -0.10 -0.01 -0.19 0.21 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.30
σ 1.19
Table 12: Affinity matrix for lesbians (25-50 year old, 810 couples)
I1 I2 I3 I4
Share of surplus 49.30 35.09 12.10 3.51
(Standard deviation) (3.20) (3.68) (1.21) (1.66)
Table 13: Shares of systematic surplus for lesbians (25-50 year old, 810 couples)
I1 I2 I3
Age 0.98 0.17 0.14
Education 0.15 -0.97 0.15
Wage 0.09 -0.19 -0.50
Hours -0.13 0.03 0.84
Table 14: Indices of attractiveness for lesbians (25-50 year old, 810 couples)
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Partner
Head Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 0.76 0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.00
Education 0.06 1.22 0.18 0.05 0.00
Wage 0.03 0.18 0.08 -0.25 0.00
Hours -0.11 -0.07 -0.16 0.22 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.22
σ 1.29
Table 15: Affinity matrix from bipartite estimation for lesbians (25-50 year old, 810 couples)
Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 0.78 0.08 0.03 -0.09 0.00
Education 0.08 0.94 0.24 -0.02 0.00
Wage 0.03 0.24 0.11 -0.20 0.00
Hours -0.09 -0.02 -0.20 0.35 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.16
σ 1.27
Table 16: Affinity matrix for childless lesbians (25-50 year old, 504 couples)
LIKE ATTRACT LIKE? 45
Appendix D. Unmarried heterosexuals
Women
Men Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 1.19 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.00
Education -0.11 0.66 0.52 0.02 0.00
Wage -0.04 0.27 0.12 0.01 0.00
Hours -0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.10 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.97
σ 1.03
Table 17: Affinity matrix for unmarried heterosexuals (25-50 year old, 4,799 couples)
I1 I2 I3 I4
Share of surplus 59.55 34.49 4.50 1.45
(Standard deviation) (2.08) (1.55) (0.49) (0.82)
Table 18: Shares of systematic surplus for unmarried heterosexuals (25-50 year old, 4,799
couples)
I1 M I1 W I2 M I2 W I3 M I3 W
Age 0.99 0.99 -0.16 -0.13 0.02 0.04
Education -0.16 -0.11 -0.96 -0.90 0.06 -0.22
Wage -0.04 -0.07 -0.24 -0.42 -0.13 0.42
Hours -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.99 0.88
Table 19: Indices of attractiveness for unmarried heterosexuals (25-50 year old, 4,799 cou-
ples)
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Women
Men Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 1.13 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.00
Education -0.08 0.92 0.35 0.09 0.00
Wage -0.01 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.00
Hours -0.06 0.04 0.02 0.24 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.51
σ 1.05
Table 20: Affinity matrix for childless unmarried heterosexuals (25-50 year old, 4,335 cou-
ples)
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Appendix E. Married heterosexuals
Women
Men Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 2.25 -0.21 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Education -0.01 0.85 0.38 -0.11 0.00
Wage 0.05 0.47 0.03 -0.14 0.00
Hours 0.06 0.02 -0.18 -0.01 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.42
σ 0.98
Table 21: Affinity matrix for married heterosexuals (25-50 year old, 4,959 couples)
I1 I2 I3 I4
Share of surplus 63.44 29.61 4.88 2.07
(Standard deviation) (1.89) (1.22) (0.20) (0.49)
Table 22: Shares of systematic surplus for married heterosexuals (25-50 year old, 4,959
couples)
I1 M I1 W I2 M I2 W I3 M I3 W
Age 1.00 0.99 -0.06 -0.10 0.05 0.03
Education -0.07 -0.10 -0.92 -0.96 0.38 0.04
Wage 0.02 -0.00 -0.37 -0.20 -0.90 0.41
Hours 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.14 -0.22 0.91
Table 23: Indices of attractiveness for married heterosexuals (25-50 year old, 4,959 couples)
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Women
Men Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 1.91 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 0.00
Education -0.08 1.11 0.19 -0.03 0.00
Wage 0.04 0.35 0.14 -0.18 0.00
Hours -0.01 0.02 -0.21 0.19 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.10
σ 0.98
Table 24: Affinity matrix for childless married heterosexuals (25-50 year old, 5,223 couples)
Women
Men Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 2.12 -0.18 0.01 -0.04 0.00
Education -0.10 0.89 0.42 -0.15 0.00
Wage 0.07 0.37 0.06 -0.15 0.00
Hours 0.12 0.01 -0.15 0.06 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.42
σ 0.98
Table 25: Affinity matrix for married heterosexuals with one child (25-50 year old, 5,318
couples)
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Women
Men Age Education Wage Hours Race
Age 2.35 -0.19 0.02 0.01 0.00
Education 0.04 0.69 0.11 -0.07 0.00
Wage 0.04 0.33 0.01 -0.15 0.00
Hours 0.03 -0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.00
Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.65
σ 1.00
Table 26: Affinity matrix for married heterosexuals with three children (25-50 year old,
4,322 couples)
Appendix F. Share of total systematic surplus explained by ethnicity
Marriage market Share
Gays 32.92%
Lesbians 42.11%
Unmarried heterosexuals 45.31%
Married heterosexuals 46.41%
Table 27: Shares of total systematic surplus explained by ethnicity on each marriage market
